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The Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, the debtor and debtor-in-
possession (the “Debtor” or the “Diocese”) in this case, respectfully submits this Reply in further 
support of its Motion for an Order Establishing Deadlines for Filing Proofs of Claim and Granting 
Related Relief [Dkt. No. 174] (the “Motion”), and in response to the objections and responses filed 
by (i) the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”), [Dkt. Nos. 215, 229] (the 
“Committee Objection” and the “Committee Reply” respectively); (ii) certain underwriters at 
Lloyd’s London and London Market Insurance Companies (collectively, “LMI”), [Dkt. Nos. 199, 
232] (the “LMI Objection” and the “LMI Reply” respectively); (iii) Interstate Fire & Casualty 
Company (“IFC”) [Dkt. Nos. 200, 233]; (iv) Evanston Insurance Company (“Associated 
International”) [Dkt. No. 213]; and (v) Arrowood Indemnity Insurance Company (“Arrowood”) 
[Dkt. No. 214] (the “Arrowood Objection”). 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Debtor has worked with the Committee to resolve all but two of the issues 
raised by the Committee on this Motion.  Most significantly, the Debtor and the Committee now 
agree, with the exception of the one issue identified directly below, on the scope and content of 
the appropriate direct and publication notice program to notify claimants of the requirement to 
submit proofs of claim. 
2. The two issues that remain are the date by which proofs of claim are to be submitted 
(the “bar date”) and whether a list of certain accused abusers that the Diocese agrees will be 
provided on the claims agent’s website—and a link to the claim’s agent website on the Diocese’s 
website—should be accompanied by a picture of those accused individuals.  For both of these 
issues, the Committee’s proposals reach beyond the bounds of an appropriate notice program as 
required by the Bankruptcy Rules and governing case law. 
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3. First, as to the bar date, the Second Circuit has made clear that bar dates are to be 
set so that claims may be identified with “reasonable promptness.”  In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 
115, 128 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added; quoting In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 937 F.2d 833, 840 (2d 
Cir. 1991)).  To accommodate the more extensive, revised notice program agreed to by the 
Committee and the Debtor, the Debtor has compromised and is prepared to move forward with 
this case with a proposed bar date near the end of May 2021.  This nearly 120-day notice period is 
far beyond the minimally required 21-days’ notice allowed for by Bankruptcy Rule 2002.    
4. The Committee, however, has proposed a bar date of August 14, 2021, which is 
nearly 10 months after the Debtor made its bar date motion and 7 months or about 210 days after 
the re-scheduled hearing on this motion.  This is almost twice as long as the period required to 
effectuate the parties’ agreed-upon notice program.  The Committee’s proposed bar date would 
unduly delay this case, forestalling by several months the date by which the universe of claimants 
is known.  This, in turn, will mean long delays before all stakeholders, including the Diocese’s 
insurance carriers, can engage in meaningful negotiations and mediation to finalize a proposed 
plan for this case and, ultimately, long delays in the resolution of creditors’ claims.   
5. The reason the Committee proposes such a lengthy, 7-month proof of claim process 
is that, in the Committee’s view, the date for submitting a simple proof of claim form in this 
bankruptcy case should be the same as the revised, current deadline for preparing a complaint and 
filing a civil action in state court pursuant to the Child Victims Act (the “CVA”).  This is, in effect, 
a limitations period.  But bankruptcy courts do not allow the end of a limitations period to control 
the setting of a bar date.  If they did, bar dates would routinely be set years after the filing of a 
petition for bankruptcy.  There is no reason to allow for the effective limitations period for most 
of the claimants in this case to control the setting of the bar date.  Courts have made clear that 
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personal injury claimants are not afforded any special treatment in determining appropriate notice.  
Moreover, the reasons that the New York State Legislature extended the CVA deadline by one 
year from August 2020 to August 2021 do not apply to the submission of proofs of claim in a 
bankruptcy proceeding.  The Legislature was principally concerned with court closures in the New 
York State system at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic and allowing for more time necessary 
to prepare a complaint to commence a civil action in light of the pandemic.  Not only has this 
Court remained opened for filings during the pandemic, but far less effort and time (and no lawyer) 
is necessary to complete the simple proof of claim form in this case—as to which, as to form, the 
Debtor and the Committee agree.  For these and other reasons addressed in more detail below, the 
Debtor respectfully requests that the Court keep this case on track for prompt resolution by setting 
a bar date in May 2021, in accordance with the detailed, extensive, agreed-upon program for 
providing direct and publication notice to claimants and potential claimants. 
6. The second issue is that, while the Debtor has agreed with the Committee to provide 
a list of certain clergy who have been accused of abuse on the claims agent’s website, the 
Committee is insisting that this list also be accompanied by pictures of the accused abusers.  The 
Committee cannot point to any evidence—and there is none, as its own proffered expert 
acknowledges—that these pictures will lead to any increased recall by claimants who, it is worth 
noting, would already have been prompted to go to the website and then review the list of accused 
individuals provided by the Diocese.  There is also no authority of which the Debtor is aware—
and the Committee provides none—that would have the Court impose a form of notice designed 
(without evidence) to “cue” claimants’ recall to aid them in determining whether they have a claim 
against the Debtor.  This is not within the Court’s responsibilities or the proper scope of a program 
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to notify known and potential creditors of the claims process in accordance with the Bankruptcy 
Rules. 
7. Finally, the Debtor addresses the objections by the Diocese’s insurance carriers, 
which should be overruled as discussed in more detail below because the insurance carriers are 
attempting to graft onto the proof of claim form—which, again, is agreed to by the Debtor and the 
Committee—a series of questions that improperly interject issues concerning the insurance 
carriers’ defenses that are both not valid and not appropriately raised in connection with a 
creditor’s proof of claim against a debtor. 
8. The Debtor, accordingly, respectfully requests that the Court enter the revised, 
proposed Bar Date Order attached as Exhibit A to the accompanying Declaration of Todd R. 
Geremia.  This revised, proposed Order reflects the terms agreed upon by the Committee and the 
Debtor concerning the scope of the notice program and additionally incorporates the Debtor’s 
positions—as addressed in this Reply—on the remaining issues between the Debtor, the 
Committee, and the Debtor’s insurance carriers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD SET THE BAR DATE IN MAY 2021 
A. Setting a bar date in May 2021 is in the best interest of abuse victims and other 
creditors of the Diocese. 
9. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3003(c)(3) provides that “[t]he court shall 
fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be 
filed.”  This “bar date” for filing proofs of claim serves as a critical threshold to further progress 
in negotiating and confirming a plan of reorganization in this Chapter 11 case and, ultimately, in 
compensating abuse victims and other creditors.  Bar dates are set to protect the debtor’s and 
creditors’ interests.   See In re Nutri*Bevco, Inc., 117 B.R. 771, 781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Bar 
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dates protect not only the debtor’s interests, but creditors’ interests as well.  It establishes a date 
by which the plan proponent can determine which liabilities will be asserted against the estate.”).  
Here, the Diocese cannot move forward with meaningful discussions regarding the establishment 
of a settlement fund to compensate victims, or with respect to the contribution of the Diocese’s 
insurance carriers toward such fund, until the bar date has passed and the universe of claimants 
and the years and insurance policies implicated by those claims are known.  The further progress 
of this case thus critically turns on the bar date. 
10. The Committee’s request to extend the bar date into August 2021 will prejudice its 
own constituency.  By delaying the bar date, the Committee will only stall the progression of the 
Chapter 11 process.  As the Committee notes, its constituency includes elderly claimants 
(Committee Objection at 11), whose claims in some instances go back several decades, and also 
claimants impacted adversely by the COVID-19 pandemic.  Adding three months of delay to this 
case prejudices those claimants who have stepped forward and who are awaiting the confirmation 
of a plan in this Chapter 11 case to achieve a resolution of their claims and, ultimately, 
compensation. 
11. Although Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(7) requires as little as 21-days’ notice of an 
upcoming claim submission deadline, the Diocese has, from the outset, sought to provide 
significantly more notice in this case.  A survey comparing the amount of time afforded to 
claimants to file proofs of claim in other recent Chapter 11 cases involving large numbers of abuse 
claims is attached hereto as Exhibit C.  Among the fourteen cases surveyed going back to 2015, 
abuse claimants were afforded between 55 and 192 days from the date the bankruptcy court entered 
its order setting a bar date to prepare and submit specialized proof of claim forms, with the average 
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claim submission period being approximately 128 days (just over 4 months).2  In contrast, the 
Committee now seeks to establish a bar date that is almost twice the average of the other surveyed 
cases and seven months (215 days) from the date of hearing on this motion.  The Diocese 
respectfully submits that this extended period is unduly long and will only lead to increased costs 
to the estate at the expense of victim compensation, as well as potentially jeopardizing the ability 
of the Diocese to continue its critical ministries by delaying its emergency from the Chapter 11 
process. 
B. Policy considerations that drove the CVA deadline extension are not 
applicable here. 
12. In advocating for a bar date more than 210 days after the hearing on this Motion, 
the Committee focuses on the deadline for filing a civil action pursuant to the Child Victims Act.  
This is, for all intents and purposes, a statute of limitations.  Bar dates are not, however, determined 
by when statutes of limitations expire on creditors’ claims.  The Committee’s position would set a 
precedent that would lead to long delays in the resolution of bankruptcy cases. 
13. The Second Circuit has held that, as a “necessary step in achieving the goal of 
successful reorganization,” bar dates are to be set so that claims may be identified with “reasonable 
promptness.”  In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added; quoting In 
re Hooker Invs., Inc., 937 F.2d 833, 840 (2d Cir. 1991)).  In making its extraordinary request for 
a bar date nearly seven months out, the Committee focuses on how the vast majority of claimants 
here will assert personal injuries.  But courts have made clear that “[a] personal injury claimant is 
given no special dispensation.  The claimant must comply with the Code, the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, and court orders for claims handling procedures before there is a valid 
                                                 
2 This survey does not include the 338 day claim submission period set in the chapter 11 case of the Diocese 
of Buffalo, New York, which is an outlier.  Even if that bar date were included in the survey, the average claim 
submission period would still only be 141.9 days. 
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bankruptcy claim . . . .”  In re Best Products Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(citation omitted). 
14. The August 14, 2021 date for filing a civil action pursuant to the CVA does not 
support the long delay that the Committee seeks in this case.  This date, as noted, is akin to a statute 
of limitations for commencing a civil action.  And the principal considerations that went into 
setting this new date—the time it takes to find a lawyer and prepare a civil action and that, for a 
period during the COVID-19 pandemic, the New York State court system was not accepting new 
civil actions—do not apply in the context of this Chapter 11 case.3 
15. Other bankruptcy courts have rejected similar attempts to use the CVA deadline for 
filing a complaint to dictate a bar date in a bankruptcy case.  In the Diocese of Rochester’s Chapter 
11 case, for example, Judge Warren denied a motion from the unsecured creditors’ committee to 
extend the bar date to make it coterminous with the then-recently enlarged CVA window and in 
doing so disposed of many of the same arguments raised by the Committee in its objection here.  
See In re the Diocese of Rochester, Case No. 19-20905 (PRW) (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020) 
[Dkt. No. 700] (the “Rochester Decision”).  In denying the request to extend the bar date in that 
case through January 14, 2021, which was a revised deadline for commencing CVA civil actions 
set by an Executive Order before the Legislature extended it until August 2021, Judge Warren 
                                                 
3 See Sen. Brad Hoylman, Press Release, Senator Hoylman Responds To Announced Extension Of CVA 
Look-Back Window (May 8, 2020) (available at https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/brad-
hoylman/senator-hoylman-responds-announced-extension-cva-look-back) (The CVA deadline extension “help[s] 
make up for lost time while New York’s courts are closed to the filing of new claims.  Coming forward as a survivor 
of child sexual abuse takes courage, focus and lots of time.  As the unemployment rate spikes above 14%, it's 
unreasonable to expect survivors of child sexual abuse to do the emotional and legal work necessary to file CVA 
lawsuits while simultaneously fighting to pay rent and put food on the table.”); see also Gov. Andrew Cuomo, Press 
Release, Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Extending Look Back Window for Child Victims Act (Aug. 3, 2020) 
(available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-extending-look-back-window-
child-victims-act) (“The Child Victims Act brought a long-needed pathway to justice for people who were abused, 
and helps right wrongs that went unacknowledged and unpunished for far too long and we cannot let this pandemic 
limit the ability for survivors to have their day in court.”). 
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expressly noted that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted claimants’ ability to commence new 
actions in the New York State court system, which stopped accepting filings in most matters at the 
onset of the pandemic, but that the federal bankruptcy court remained open for business 
throughout.  See Rochester Decision 3-4.  Judge Warren also observed that, notwithstanding the 
pandemic, between March 16, 2020 and July 29, 2020, 172 abuse claimants had successfully filed 
proofs of claim with the debtor’s claims agent.  Id. at 4.  Ultimately, Judge Warren balanced the 
interests of unknown potential claimants against those actual known abuse claimants who had 
already filed their proofs of claim, and declined to extend the bar date until the new January 2021 
deadline for submitting CVA claims.  Id. at 8.4   
16. The Committee accuses the Diocese of asking the Court to “curtail the will of the 
legislature and shorten the CVA window that has given survivors hope for justice after decades of 
waiting.”  Committee Objection at 3.  But the New York State Legislature was focused on when 
civil actions should be filed and did not purport to address the business of federal bankruptcy courts 
in setting a bar date.  Here, the Diocese is seeking only what the Second Circuit commands in 
setting a bar date pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3):  the establishment of a reasonably 
prompt deadline for submission of proofs of claim, as this and other courts routinely order in 
Chapter 11 cases. 
17. Indeed, bankruptcy courts regularly set a bar date that is shorter, often by years, 
than the available time allowed to file suit under the applicable state law statute of limitations.  For 
instance, the New York Legislature has expressed a clear policy of providing a six-year statute of 
limitations for breach of contract claims, but no court would take seriously a request to set a bar 
                                                 
4 Judge Warren also did not foreclose the submission of additional abuse claims after the bar date.  The court 
did, however, correctly hold that any claimant seeking to file a later claim would need to demonstrate “cause” under 
Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3).  Id. 
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date nearly six years into the future so that creditors would be afforded the full period of time 
allotted to assert a breach of contract claim in accordance with this limitations period.  Judge 
Cangilos-Ruiz in the Diocese of Syracuse bankruptcy case made the same observation.  See 
Syracuse Tr. 42:2 – 42:4 (“[I]n all cases there can be a statute of limitations that’s out there for six 
year tort claims where the bar date is not six years.”) (attached as Exhibit D to Geremia Decl.).  In 
several other bankruptcy cases involving diocesan debtors, the court set or enforced bar dates that 
occurred before the civil action filing deadline for bringing a civil action.5 
18. For the same reasons Judge Warren denied the requested bar date extension in the 
Rochester Decision, the Committee’s policy arguments in support of extending the bar date to 
match the state law deadline to file CVA lawsuits should be rejected.  This Court has, despite the 
pandemic, remained open and available to litigants.  The reduced availability of state courts at the 
outset of the COVID-19 pandemic has not, in any way, impacted creditors’ ability to engage in the 
simple process of preparing and submitting proofs of claim in this case. 
19. The Diocese’s compromise with respect to the notice program for this case—that 
is, the Diocese’s acceptance of certain aspects of the New York-intensive notice program proposed 
by the Committee’s expert, Dr. Wheatman—also addresses the second policy concern highlighted 
by the Committee:  providing abuse victims with sufficient time to emotionally and legally prepare 
to file a civil action. 
20. Again, the claimants here will not be filing civil actions in State court but proofs of 
claim in bankruptcy court.  Far less time is necessary to do “legal preparation” to submit a proof 
of claim.  The amount of time necessary to complete and return the Diocese’s proposed abuse 
                                                 
5 See Rochester Decision at 8; In re The Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse, New York, Case No. 20-30663 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2020) [Dkt. No. 214]; In re The Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, Case No. 15-
30125 (Bankr. D. Minn., April 17, 2015) [Dkt. No. 188]. 
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proof of claim form—which, in addition to soliciting general contact information for each 
claimant, consists of a limited number of substantive inquiries regarding the basic facts 
surrounding the claim—pales in contrast to the time and effort necessary to investigate and prepare 
a civil action and to gather evidence sufficient to meet a plaintiff’s burden of proof at trial.  
Plaintiffs seeking to file a lawsuit in state court are generally reliant upon the services of a lawyer 
to assist them in drafting papers, navigating court rules and prosecuting their cases, and some 
plaintiffs may have been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic in their ability to work with 
counsel to properly prepare and prosecute a CVA civil action.  By stark contrast to preparing to 
commence a civil action, however, the proof of claim form agreed upon by the Diocese and the 
Committee here can be easily completed without the need of an attorney or any specialized 
knowledge of law or court procedure.  Indeed, claimants will have the option to complete and 
submit a proof of claim electronically through an interface hosted on the case management website 
maintained the Diocese’s claims agent.  A May 2021 bar date is more than adequate to allow all 
abuse claimants to complete and submit their proofs of claim in this case. 
21. The Diocese acknowledges that, for some abuse victims, emotionally preparing to 
confront the details of their abuse in connection with making a claim may be challenging.  But, by 
contrast to a civil action, the claim submission process in this Chapter 11 case is substantially less 
daunting.  As an initial matter, even if a plaintiff is granted leave to file a lawsuit under a 
pseudonym, the case itself and most pleadings remain open and available to the public which may 
deter some victims from pursuing a lawsuit.  Proofs of claim alleging sexual abuse submitted in 
this case, by contrast, will be kept strictly confidential in accordance with the procedures laid out 
in the Diocese’s motion. 
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22. Additionally, in a civil action where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, a victim 
might hesitate at the prospect of having to provide testimony in discovery or at trial.  In the Chapter 
11 process, however, once an abuse claimant provides a completed proof of claim, that proof of 
claim constitutes prima facie evidence of a valid claim.  So long as sufficiently responsive answers 
are provided on the form, the likelihood of any need for additional claim discovery or testimony 
from victims in this Chapter 11 case is substantially lower than it would be in a CVA civil action. 
23. The Diocese also observes that, by the time the proposed May 2021 bar date occurs, 
individuals will have had over two full years from the date the CVA was enacted to contemplate 
pursuing their claims.  Further, the New York State Legislature may enact a further extension of 
the CVA deadline, or even eliminate the statute of limitations altogether as some have advocated.  
The Diocese and the Court in this Chapter 11 case cannot be expected to delay progress toward 
confirmation indefinitely while awaiting what may be a floating deadline for filing all possible 
state court claims. 
24. For all of these reasons, the Court should not delay this case by setting a bar date 
nearly seven months from now, in August 2021, but should set a reasonably prompt bar date in 
May 2021 which allows for the implementation of the notice program agreed upon by the 
Committee and the Diocese.  The additional time afforded to plaintiffs to initiate a civil action 
pursuant to the CVA should not dictate the date for submitting a far simpler proof of claim form 
in this Chapter 11 case.  As Judge Warren recognized in the Rochester Decision, in the unlikely 
event that the pandemic or other factors present a true barrier to the submission of claims on a 
timely basis, claimants may always individually seek to file a late claim pursuant to Bankruptcy 
Rule 3003(c)(3), but the Court should not preemptively delay a resolution for all other claimants 
and stakeholders in this case. 
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C. Abuse claimants are unlikely to be confused by the multiple deadlines. 
25. The Committee also speculates that abuse claimants may be confused by publicity 
of the extension of the CVA deadline which provides that the last date to initiate a lawsuit in New 
York state court under the CVA is August 14, 2021.  Committee Objection at 11.  The Diocese 
respectfully submits that, in addition to the publication and dissemination of the bar date notice 
proposed by the Diocese, news media coverage and attorney advertising will provide significant 
additional advertisement of the bar date in this Chapter 11 case such that potential claimant will 
not reasonably be confused about the need to submit a proof of claim or the deadline for doing so.   
26. It is important to recognize that any analysis regarding the efficacy of the 
publication of the bar date notice must be limited to the impact of such notice on unknown 
creditors.  All persons known to the Diocese to have asserted a claim of any kind will receive direct 
notice by mail of the bar date.  Whether notice is reasonable or adequate depends on whether a 
creditor is known or unknown to the Diocese.  See Grant v. U.S. Home Corp. (In re U.S.H. Corp. 
of NY), 223 B.R. 654, 658 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).  “Known” creditors must receive actual notice 
of bankruptcy proceedings.  See id. at 659.  By contrast, notice by media publication is sufficient 
to satisfy the requirements of due process for “unknown” creditors.  See See DePippo v. Kmart 
Corp., 335 B.R. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  Notice by publication, while not equivalent to actual 
service of notice, has been consistently approved by the Supreme Court as comporting with due 
process “where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning.”  
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that “in the case of persons missing or unknown” employment of 
indirect notice via publication “is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to 
a final decree foreclosing their rights.”  Id.  
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27. Here, hundreds of abuse claimants are already known to the Diocese because they 
have (i) reported their alleged abuse (either directly or through counsel), (ii) participated in (or 
sought to participate in) the Diocese’s well-publicized Independent Reconciliation and 
Compensation Program (the “IRCP”), (iii) filed CVA actions against the Diocese prior to the 
Petition Date or (iv) filed CVA actions against parishes and other Catholic entities following the 
Petition Date, which, but for the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, presumably would have also 
named the Diocese as a defendant in such action.  The overwhelming majority of these known 
claimants are represented by counsel.  Each of these known abuse claimants (or, in most cases, 
their counsel) will receive a copy of the bar date notice by direct mail which will unambiguously 
advise as to the deadline set for the submission of proofs of claim in this case.  That direct notice 
to known claimants and their counsel should altogether eliminate any concerns of confusion as to 
the applicable deadline.  There is, in short, no identifiable risk that any of the hundreds of known 
abuse claimants will not receive notice of the bar date or will be confused as to the appropriate 
deadline to submit their claims. 
28. Also, even if some abuse claimants exist who are unknown to the Diocese, the 
robust notice program upon which the Committee and the Diocese now agree will ensure that any 
person wishing to assert a claim will be provided with notice and have a full and fair opportunity 
to do so.  The Committee’s proposed bar date of August 14, 2021 would place the interests of a 
likely small pool of individuals ahead of the hundreds of already known abuse claimants who have 
a very real interest in achieving a reasonably prompt resolution of their claims.  As the Fourth 
Circuit observed in Vancouver Women’s Health Soc. v. A.H. Robins Co., a bankruptcy court must 
balance the interests of existing claimants and other stakeholders against potential claimants in 
connection with notice issues: 
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In bankruptcy, the court has an obligation not only to the potential 
claimants, but also to existing claimants and the petitioner's 
stockholders.  The court must balance the needs of notification of 
potential claimants with the interest of existing creditors and 
claimants.  A bankrupt estate's resources are always limited and the 
bankruptcy court must use discretion in balancing these interests 
when deciding how much to spend on notification. 
820 F.2d 1359, 1364 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoted in In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 358 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).  In that case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court order declining 
to extend the bar date on the grounds that sufficient notice had already been provided to unknown 
claimants and that an extended bar date would delay the available recovery for those creditors who 
had timely submitted claims.  Similarly, here, the Committee and the Debtor agree upon a program 
that will provide extensive and thorough notice to claimants and the Court should properly account 
for the interests of the known abuse claimants in having their claims addressed promptly and reject 
the long-delayed bar date sought by the Committee. 
D. Meaningful progress can be made before the CVA window closes. 
29. A reasonably prompt bar date in May 2021 is also instrumental to making 
meaningful progress in this case.  Establishing the universe of claimants is critical to gathering the 
Diocese’s insurance carriers and other stakeholders to start serious work toward achieving a 
resolution of this case.  The Committee contends to the contrary (Committee Objection at 11-12, 
14), by pointing to perceived impediments to achieving a global resolution of claims against 
parishes and other non-debtor entities.  These concerns are speculative and misplaced. 
30. As discussed above, the history of CVA litigation against the Diocese and the 
Diocese’s efforts in connection with the IRCP reflect that the substantial majority of claimants 
against the Diocese and its affiliates have already emerged.  Moreover, as the experience with 
CVA litigation against the Diocese shows, it is highly unlikely that individuals will assert abuse 
claims against parishes and non-debtor affiliates of the Diocese without also asserting a claim 
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against the Diocese.  Finally, for the same reasons addressed above, the CVA deadline for filing 
civil actions against parishes and other non-debtors should not control the bar date as to the 
Diocese.  Indeed, non-debtors facing varying limitations periods have contributed to diocesan 
settlements and obtained the protection of a channeling injunction when, and if, they substantially 
contribute to a settlement.  See, e.g., In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., Case No. 09-
13560 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2011) [Dkt. No. 1471 (order confirming second amended Chapter 
11 plan of reorganization including channeling injunction for various non-debtor entities)].  
31. A reasonably prompt bar date in May 2021 for claims against the Diocese will 
provide the Diocese and its insurance carriers with critical information regarding the total number 
of abuse claims that will need to be addressed in the context of a plan of reorganization, the basic 
details of the alleged abuse, and the insurance policies and years implicated by such claims.  The 
Diocese respectfully submits that these basic elements are necessary to allow for meaningful 
negotiations—and, if warranted, mediation—with the insurance carriers regarding the scope and 
availability of a pool of insurance coverage, even if additional state court actions against parishes 
and other Catholic entities have not yet been fully foreclosed.  See In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 937 
F.2d 833, 840 (2d Cir. 1991) (“To be sure, the amount of the claims may not be finally determined 
until adversary proceedings have been concluded, but establishing the identities and interests of 
the participants so that the claims-allowance process may begin is an essential function served by 
a bar order.”). 
E. A delayed Bar Date will increase costs and dissipate assets that could fund a 
plan and support the critical ministries of the Diocese.  
32. In addition to the harm that the hundreds of known abuse victims will suffer from 
the delay in resolving their claims, prolonging this Chapter 11 case by implementing an August 
14, 2021 bar date will also likely diminish overall victim recovery. 
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33. While progress towards a Chapter 11 plan will be stalled until the bar date passes, 
the Diocese will nevertheless continue to incur Chapter 11 administrative expenses, including 
United States Trustee fees and legal fees for its own counsel and for counsel to the Committee, 
dissipating funds that might otherwise be used to satisfy abuse victims.  The Diocese has finite 
assets.  Each month that the Diocese remains in Chapter 11 will (a) diminish the ultimate recovery 
for abuse victims, (b) add extensive delays to the resolution of this case and payment of victim 
claims, and (c) threaten to weaken and reduce the Diocese’s ability to carry out and support the 
important ministries of the Catholic Church on Long Island by delaying the Diocese’s emergence 
from bankruptcy.   
34. As the Court is aware, the Diocese is a non-profit organization which is largely 
dependent upon donations from the Catholic faithful to support its ongoing good works.  The 
COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the economy has negatively affected Church finances as 
parishioners have not been attending in-person services and in many cases are themselves facing 
financial uncertainty.  Declaration of Charles Moore, Managing Director of Alvarez & Marsal 
North America, LLC, Proposed Restructuring Advisor to The Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville 
Centre, New York, in Support of Chapter 11 Petition and First Day Pleadings, at ¶ 141–143 [Dkt. 
No. 3].  The Diocese has done everything in its power to encourage continued giving.  However, 
if the bar date is set for August 2021, there will be a long delay in this case and the Diocese has 
concerns that public support for the Diocese may erode.  Without robust public support, the 
Diocese’s ability to continue to carry out its mission through outreach to poor and underserved 
communities, and to provide for the pastoral, spiritual and sacramental needs of the Catholic 
faithful, will be endangered.  Moreover, the Diocese respectfully submits that the communities it 
serves are especially in need of the Diocese’s services during the pandemic and in light of the 
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attendant economic uncertainty.  It is, therefore, in the best interests of abuse claimants, the 
Diocese, and the Long Island community at large to address any historical liabilities related to 
abuse claims, and to have the Diocese exit Chapter 11, as expeditiously as possible.  The Diocese 
respectfully submits that a bar date of more than seven months from now, as proposed by the 
Committee, will negatively impact all parties in interest. 
F. A Bar Date in May 2021 provides the greatest good for the greatest number of 
victims. 
35. Finally, while the Diocese respectfully submits that a bar date in May 2021 satisfies 
the legal requirement of a reasonably prompt bar date—and an August 14, 2021 bar date does 
not—individual claimants may nevertheless seek to have their claims allowed as timely, even after 
the bar date, if they can show cause under Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3), or excusable neglect under 
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1).  Rather than extending the bar date for all claimants to allow for such 
outliers, which will cause undue delay and additional costs in this Chapter 11 Case, the Diocese 
respectfully submits that a more prudent approach is to allow any claimant who can show adequate 
cause to move the Court under the appropriate Bankruptcy Rules for an extension of time to submit 
his or her individual claim. 
II. THE EXPERT TESTIMONY PROFFERED BY THE COMMITTEE IS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE OR HELPFUL ON THIS MOTION  
36. In support of its objection, the Committee proffers Dr. Jon Conte as an expert in 
bar date notice periods and claim procedures.  Dr. Conte has submitted his testimony through a 
declaration (the “Conte Declaration”) [Dkt. No. 215 at 60-70], which purports to opine on a wide 
range of topics, including the length of time necessary between notice and the bar date, concerns 
regarding competing deadlines between the bar date and the CVA deadline, the proper recipients 
of direct notice, and the requirements of “fair notice” in the context of abuse survivors. 
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A. There is no basis for Dr. Conte’s testimony on this motion 
37. The Committee does not cite to any legal basis for submitting expert testimony in 
connection with a debtor’s motion to establish a bar date, and there is none.  The fixing of a bar 
date is a matter of law, not one of fact.  In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 137 B.R. 679, 680 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1992) (“Debtors’ motion to set a bar date came on for hearing.  At that time, the 
Committee indicated that it wished to call as a witness its valuation expert.  After due 
consideration, we denied the request because we were satisfied that the proposed testimony was 
irrelevant to what was before us, and that what was before us was entirely a question of law.”) 
(emphasis added).6  Because the establishment of a bar date is a question of law, the Committee 
cannot demonstrate that there are “disputed material factual issues” relating to the bar date motion 
that permits them to retain experts.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) (“Testimony of witnesses with 
respect to disputed material factual issues shall be taken in the same manner as testimony in an 
adversary proceeding.”). 
38. In any event, the expert testimony submitted by the Committee should not be 
considered on this Motion on a host of alternative grounds.   Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides 
that relevant evidence is admissible.  Rule 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if:  (a) it has 
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”  FED. R. EVID. 401.  Rule 702 permits 
opinion testimony from a “witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
                                                 
6  Notably, the court in Eagle-Picher, in dealing with unknown/latent asbestos claimants, rejected the 
committee’s assertion that establishing a bar date was inequitable, stating that: “The objectives of finality and fixing 
the universe of claims permeate the law of bankruptcy, and in achieving those ends, the setting of a bar date is no 
more unfair, assuming reasonable notice, than is a statute of limitations, a finality concept firmly embedded in our 
legal system generally.  Tort claimants can have their right to pursue their claims foreclosed if they fail to take action 
before the expiration of a statute of limitations.  It is no more unfair to require that they here take action before 
expiration of the bar date.”  In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 137 B.R. at 682. 
20-12345-scc    Doc 304    Filed 01/11/21    Entered 01/11/21 16:58:42    Main Document 




training, or education,” “if (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue (b) the testimony 
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and (d) the witness has reliably applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts 
of the case.”  FED. R. EVID. 702.  As the Supreme Court has explained, expert testimony admissible 
under Rule 702 “rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”  Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).   
39. Expert testimony must be reliable, which requires the Court to perform “a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the 
facts in issue.”  Id. at 592–93.  In Daubert, the Supreme Court identified factors that may bear 
upon the reliability of proposed scientific testimony, including:  (1) whether the theory or 
technique can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and 
publication; (3) the known or potential error rate of the technique; (4) the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (5) whether the technique or 
theory has gained widespread acceptance in the relevant scientific community.  Id. at 593–94 
(noting that these factors do not constitute “a definitive checklist or test”).  A court may apply the 
Daubert factors, as appropriate, in cases dealing with technical or “other specialized,” but non-
scientific, testimony.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).  The purpose of 
this analysis is to “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies 
or professional experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”  Id. at 152. 
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40. The party seeking to admit an expert bears the burden of demonstrating 
admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10.  The expert 
“may not merely recite a factual narrative that does not draw technical or scientific conclusions.”  
In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 558 B.R. 661, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).  “[S]ubjective or 
speculative opinions” are not admissible either.  Id.  Further, “[a]n expert opinion requires some 
explanation as to how the expert came to his conclusion and what methodologies or evidence 
substantiate that conclusion” in order to be admissible.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 
127 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 552 U.S. 312 (2008).  “A minor flaw in an expert’s 
reasoning or a slight modification of an otherwise reliable method” does not itself require 
exclusion, but exclusion is warranted “if the flaw is large enough that the expert lacks good 
grounds for his or her conclusions.”  Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 
267  (2d Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  When presented with an expert opinion 
that is not sufficiently grounded in reliable facts, “[a] court may conclude that there is simply too 
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
41. Dr. Conte’s proffered opinions are not grounded in any disclosed basis or 
methodology and fail to meet the evidentiary standards under Daubert.  See Conte Decl. ¶¶ 11–
19.  Dr. Conte testifies that he bases his opinions on generalized “well-established facts,” Id. ¶ 10, 
but he does not offer any studies in support of his opinions or any testable methodology to 
distinguish between the adequacies of a shorter and longer bar notice period.7  Dr. Conte admits 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Jon Conte, dated January 8, 2021, 47:12-47:15 (Dr. Conte admits 
“[t]here’s no data” to “support [his] view that 70 days is not a sufficient notice period.”) (“Conte Tr.”) (attached as 
Exhibit E to Geremia Decl.);  Id., 61:8-61:15 (Dr. Conte admits that his opinion that “the bar date in this case should 
be the same as the CVA deadline for filing claims” is “based on no testing.”); Id., 48:25-49:10 (Dr. Conte admits he 
has no “data to distinguish between the sufficiency of a 90-day period and a 120-day period and a 210-day period,” 
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that he cannot say on absolute terms what a proper notice period is.8  Nor does he offer any testable 
assertions concerning how extending the bar date by seven months will assist abuse claimants, 
how many claimants will benefit from that long extension, or how they will benefit from it.9  In 
fact, not only is there no basis underlying Dr. Conte’s testimony, but nothing in it offers a firm 
view that any claimants will benefit from the bar date extension; all purported benefits are phrased 
in speculative terms such as “may” or “likely.”  See, e.g., Conte Decl. ¶¶13, 14, 16, 17, 18.  Indeed, 
Dr. Conte did not speak to any of the claimants in preparing his opinions,10 let alone specifically 
regarding two different dates for submitting proofs of claim in a bankruptcy case.11 
42. Dr. Conte also has no basis to opine on the proposed notice in this case.  He is not 
an expert on notice procedures.12  He has no experience in designing, developing, analyzing or 
implementing legal notice plans.13  “An expert who is qualified in one field cannot offer an opinion 
about aspects of the case in another field for which the expert is not qualified—the expert must 
stay within the reasonable confines of his subject area and not render expert opinion on an entirely 
                                                 
and he is “not aware of any methodology [] to distinguish between the adequacies of a 90-day notice period, a 120-
day period, and a 210-day period,” except for his “previous experiences with cases involving victims.”). 
8 Id., 46:7-46:11 (Dr. Conte admits that, with respect to “what [] an ideal period of time” is, he “can’t answer 
that empirically” or “absolutely”).   
9 See, e.g., Id., 67:8-67:19 (Dr. Conte admits that he is unaware of any studies or data to support the view 
that “sexual abuse claimants will find it anxiety inducing to have a deadline for submitting a proof of claim that is 
different than a state court rule for submitting a claim.”); Id., 68:4-68:23 (Dr. Conte admits that he does not have any 
“professional experience in advising or counseling elderly sexual abuse claimants” on which Dr. Conte’s opinion that 
the likelihood of confusion is greater for elderly adults is based ) 
10 Id., 62:16-62:18) (Dr. Conte admits that he has not “worked with a New York plaintiff” in the context of 
two different bar dates.). 
11 Id. 67:25-68:3 (Dr. admits that he does not “have any experience with claimants in talking to them about 
two different dates for submitting claims.”). 
12 Id., 41:5-45:4 (Dr. Conte admits he has no “experience in the study of notice plans in connection with court 
proceedings,” has “reviewed and commented on issues like definition” but has not done a “formal study per se” on 
legal notice plans, does not “hold [himself] out as an expert on providing legal notice in court cases,” and has not 
“published any articles regarding the provision of legal notice in court cases.”). 
13 Id.  
20-12345-scc    Doc 304    Filed 01/11/21    Entered 01/11/21 16:58:42    Main Document 




different field or discipline.”  S.E.C. v. Revelation Capital Mgmt, Ltd., 215 F. Supp. 3d 267, 273 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted).   
43. Finally, Dr. Conte’s testimony regarding whether fair notice to abuse survivors is 
subject to the “typical abused person” standard or a heightened standard must be stricken.  Conte 
Decl. ¶¶ 28–29.  Expert testimony that states a legal conclusion must be excluded, which has 
happened to Dr. Conte previously when he attempted to opine on legal issues.  See Terrell C. v. 
State Dep’t of Social and Health Servs., 120 Wash App. 20, 30 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (Dr. Conte 
cannot “offer opinions of law in the guise of expert testimony”); Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. 
Schneider, 379 F. Supp. 2d 461, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[I]t is axiomatic that an expert is not 
permitted to provide legal opinions, legal conclusions, or interpret legal terms; those roles fall 
solely within the province of the court.”) (citation omitted) (quoted in In re Thilman, 557 B.R. 294, 
300 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016)).14  In any event, Dr. Conte’s argument for a “typical abused person” 
standard, which is a principal basis for his view endorsing a lengthy notice period here, has no 
basis in law. 
III. PHOTOS OF ACCUSED PERPETRATORS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN 
THE SEXUAL ABUSE BAR DATE NOTICE 
44. The Debtor has agreed with the Committee to include in the Sexual Abuse Bar Date 
Notice a list of the names of certain accused perpetrators.  The Committee and Dr. Conte propose 
that the Bar Date Notice also include a picture of each accused perpetrator taken at or close to the 
time of the alleged sexual abuse, so as to further cue recall and increase responses by survivors.  
                                                 
14 See also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364 (2d Cir. 1992) (trial court improperly admitted testimony 
defining legal phrase “deadly physical force” in manner inconsistent with applicable definition in New York Penal 
Law); United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140, rev'd in part on reh'g on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(excluding expert's repeated use of statutory and regulatory language indicating guilt); LinkCo, Inc. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 
2002 WL 1585551, at*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002) (excluding expert testimony that “it is my expert opinion that 
[defendant] misappropriated trade secrets that originated at [the plaintiff's].”).   
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Conte Decl. ¶ 25; Committee Objection at 22.  The Court should reject this proposal because it is 
not required by due process.  And, by Dr. Conte’s own admission there is no methodology, or any 
support at all, to show that including pictures with the name list will increase claimant responses, 
and if so to what extent. 
45. To the extent the Committee suggests that notice will not be sufficient unless it 
includes the pictures of accused perpetrators, whether or not the underlying claims have been 
vetted, that is simply not the law.  A bar date notice serves to “apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”  Mullane v. 
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted).  Due process is 
met as long as “notice is reasonably calculated to reach all interested parties, reasonably conveys 
all of the required information, and permits a reasonable amount of time for response.”  DePippo 
v. Kmart Corp., 335 B.R. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quotation marks omitted; citing Mullane, 339 
U.S. at 314).  There is, in particular, no requirement that the bar date notice must also provide 
“cues” to potential claimants to assist them in determining whether they have a claim to assert.  
Indeed, the Diocese is aware only of one bankruptcy case involving claims of sexual abuse where 
the bar date notice included photos of the alleged accusers—and the issue was not contested in that 
matter.15 
46. Further, Dr. Conte admits that “there’s no way to know” whether adding pictures 
to the name list “will increase the number of potential claimants who may come forward,” other 
than the “general supposition” that “the more cues, the more likely it is to stimulate” recall.  Conte 
Tr.  94:10-94:21.  In particular, Dr. Conte agreed that, for those individuals who would already be 
                                                 
15 See Bar Date Order at 16, In re The Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Dkt. No. 
91, Case No. 20-10846 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2020). 
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prompted by a notice to visit the claim’s agent website, there is no way to know how many more 
would be “cued” to assert a claim by reviewing pictures on the website in addition to reviewing 
the list of accused abusers that the Diocese has agreed it will provide.  Conte Tr. 93:15-94:9. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE THE INSURERS’ OBJECTIONS 
47. The insurers’ objections are meritless and should be overruled. 
48. In LMI’s objection, 16  it requests several revisions to the Bar Date Order, 
Confidentiality Agreement, and Sexual Abuse Proof of Claim (“POC”) form:  that all of the 
Diocese’s insurers receive all Sexual Abuse POC forms and be permitted to use them in their 
evaluation of any and all underlying claims—regardless of within which insurance coverage period 
the claim allegedly falls (Request Nos. 1 & 2, LMI Objection at 3–4); that the claimant be required 
to disclose whether anyone has asserted a related claim on their behalf (Request No. 3(a), LMI 
Objection at 4); and that the following question be added to the Sexual Abuse POC form: 
Please provide all facts you are aware of that suggest that the 
Diocese, or any of its officers or employees, knew or should have 
known that the abuser was abusing you or others before or during 
the period of time when the abuse or other wrongful conduct took 
place. 
(Request No. 3(b), LMI Objection at 4). 
49. Arrowood also filed an objection, in which it proposed the addition of the following 
question to the Sexual Abuse POC form: 
Have you previously filed a lawsuit, made a claim, or filed a proof 
of claim concerning sexual abuse you suffered that was committed 
by any other individual entity, other than an abuser affiliated with a 
church, parish, school, or Diocesan organization?  If so, please state 
the date(s) of abuse, abuser and his/her affiliated employer/entity. 
Arrowood Objection at 2. 
                                                 
16 IFC and Associated International joined in LMI’s objection.  See Dkt. Nos. 200, 213. 
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50. These objections are misplaced and should be overruled. 
A. The insurers are not entitled to Sexual Abuse POC forms that fall outside 
their coverage period. 
51. The Debtor has proposed in its proposed bar date order that each of its insurers 
should receive Sexual Abuse POC forms for claims that allege sexual abuse during time periods 
that the insurer provided coverage to the Debtor.  See Ex. A at 7 ¶ 15(c)(iv), Geremia Decl.  
Because the Debtor’s insurers provided coverage to the Debtor during discrete time periods, claims 
that allege the occurrence of sexual abuse when a particular insurer did not provide coverage to 
the Debtor fall outside the scope of such insurer’s coverage.  See Adversary Proceeding No. 20-
01227, Dkt.. No. 1 Ex. A (list of insurance policies and their respective policy periods).  The 
Debtor is under no obligation to provide Sexual Abuse POC forms on a universal basis to all 
insurers, and LMI has not provided any reason why it is entitled to Sexual Abuse POC forms that 
fall outside their coverage period.  The Court should thus deny LMI’s request for information that 
is otherwise irrelevant to its insurance coverage and should approve the Debtor’s proposed 
framework. 
B. The insurer’s proposed questions for the proof of claim form are 
irrelevant, unnecessary and burdensome. 
52. The Debtor also joins in the Committee’s Objection and Reply to the insurers’ 
objections with respect to the additional questions regarding the Diocese’s knowledge of abuser’s 
conduct and unrelated abuse.  [Dkt. Nos. 215 at 25-26, 229].17 
53. Because Sexual Abuse Claims differ from other claims that may be filed against 
the Debtor, the Debtor proposed a customized form for Sexual Abuse Claims in lieu of the Official 
                                                 
17 For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor does not join in the Committee’s Objection and Reply to the extent 
any position therein is inconsistent with the Debtor’s position in the Motion and this Reply.  In addition, the Debtor 
does not join in the Declaration of Jon R. Conte, Ph.D. in support of the Committee Reply, to the extent Dr. Conte 
offers legal opinions therein.  See, e.g., Dkt. No. 229 at 11–12.   
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Form contemplated by Bankruptcy Rule 3001.  See Motion at 9–10.  Although this Sexual Abuse 
Proof of Claim Form varies from the Official Form, it should not be deemed to create an 
opportunity for insurers to interject irrelevant, unnecessary or otherwise burdensome questions. 
54. LMI’s proposed question regarding the Diocese’s knowledge of abuser’s conduct 
implies that if the Diocese was aware of abuse by anyone of anyone, at any time prior to the abuse 
at issue, then abuse of anyone by anyone thereafter was expected or intended by the Diocese.  See 
LMI Objection at 5 (citing Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th 
Cir. 1996)).  LMI is in essence seeking inclusion of this question in the Sexual Abuse POC Form 
as part of its defense to coverage, and to the extent LMI may gather information from answers to 
this question demonstrating that injuries alleged by victims of sexual abuse were expected or 
intended by the Diocese, LMI will likely take the position that no coverage would be afforded 
under the relevant insurance policies.   
55. This contentious question should not be included in the Sexual Abuse POC form.  
As an initial matter, it goes to the merits of a non-party’s defense and is unnecessary for the Sexual 
Abuse POC form to be deemed a prima facie claim against the Diocese in the first instance.  In 
any event, the question is improper because LMI’s position with respect to its coverage defense is 
inconsistent with New York law.  The New York Court of Appeals has held that negligence in 
hiring or retaining an employee who commits a sexual assault constitutes an “occurrence” that is 
not “expected or intended” from the standpoint of the insured.  See RJC Realty Holding Corp. v. 
Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 2 N.Y.3d 158 (2004).  In the context of a suit against a massage parlor, 
the court explained that if the allegation of sexual abuse is true, the masseur “departed from his 
duties for solely personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of [RJC’s] business.”  Accordingly, 
the court did not ascribe the masseur’s expectations or intentions to his employer in determining 
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the applicability of the insurance policy.  Id. at 164.  The same is true in the actions brought against 
the Diocese under the Child Victims Act. 
56. LMI cites to a lengthy block quote in In re Residential Capital, LLC, 518 B.R. 720, 
731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), for the proposition that “without the [additional question], the 
claimants will not allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”  LMI 
Reply at 4–5.  But LMI conveniently omits from its discussion the following paragraph in In re 
Residential Capital, which preceded LMI’s block quote: 
Claims objections have a shifting burden of proof.  Correctly filed 
proofs of claim constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and 
amount of the claim.  To overcome this prima facie evidence, an 
objecting party must come forth with evidence which, if believed, 
would refute at least one of the allegations essential to the claim.  By 
producing evidence equal in force to the prima facie case, an 
objector can negate a claim's presumptive legal validity, thereby 
shifting the burden back to the claimant to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that under applicable law the claim should be 
allowed.  If the objector does not introduce evidence as to the 
invalidity of the claim or the excessiveness of its amount, the 
claimant need offer no further proof of the merits of the claim. 
Id. at 731 (alterations, citations and quotation marks omitted).   
57. Arrowood’s proposed question regarding unrelated abuse similarly asks for 
information that is beyond the scope of any claimant’s allegations against the Debtor.  Relevant 
questions in a POC form that this Court should approve are questions that help determine whether 
the claimant has a valid claim against the Debtor.  Questions that ask for information about other 
potential abuse claims that a claimant may have asserted against other individuals or entities are 
outside the scope of any potential claims against the Debtor and should not be included in the 
Sexual Abuse POC form. 
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The Debtor therefore respectfully requests that the Court: (i) enter the revised Bar Date 
Order attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Todd R. Geremia submitted with this Reply, and 
(ii)  grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper. 
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Dated:  January 11, 2021  
/s/  Corinne Ball     






250 Vesey Street 
New York, New York 10281 
Telephone: (212) 326-3939 
Facsimile: (212) 755-7306 
 
Counsel for the Debtor 
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